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HUMAN-AUTONOMY TEAMING - AN EVOLVING INTERACTION PARADIGM:
TEAMING AND AUTOMATION
Dale Richards
Coventry University, United Kingdom
Bill Kaliardos
Federal Aviation Administration, United States of America
Intelligent and complex systems are becoming common in our workplace and our homes, 
providing direct assistance in transport, health and education domains. In many instances
the nature of these systems are somewhat ubiquitous, and influence the manner in which
we make decisions. Traditionally we understand the benefits of how humans work within 
teams, and the associated pitfalls and costs when this team fails to work. However, we can
view the autonomous agent as a synthetic partner emerging in roles that have traditionally
been the bastion of the human alone. Within these new Human-Autonomy Teams we can
witness different levels of automation and decision support held within a clear hierarchy of
tasks and goals. However, when we start examining the nature of more autonomous 
systems and software agents we see a partnership that can suggest different constructs of
authority depending on the context of the task. This may vary in terms of whether the
human or agent is leading the team in order to achieve a goal. This paper examines the
nature of HAT composition whilst examining the application of this in aviation and how
trust in such stystems can be assessed. 
We are surrounded by advanced technologies that are not only pervasive but make us 
dependent on their use. The relationship we share with intelligent systems traditionally provide us
with an increase in efficiency, cost- or time-saving, or simply are technological tokens that we
furnish our lives with in order to convince ourselves that we belong to an ever-changing 
technological world. However, we are amidst a rather different form of technology revolution that
now affords us a degree of decision making that can either support, augment or even replace the
human component entirely. This may conjure different perceptions depending on the individual
and context of the technology being considered, but regardless of your view, there is a perception 
that such a relationship with this sort of technology is beneficial, efficient and welcomed. We have
walked this path in the past, in the form of introducing automation into systems that allow this 
technology to release the human from conducting dangerous, difficult or dull tasks. The
developments in advanced automation, autonomy and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are leading
protagonists for this advanced technology, and in many instances we can argue that humankind
has already achieved a degree of symbiosis that brings us closer to achieving human-autonomy
teaming (HAT). This panel represents a series of papers that discusses some of the main issues 
with human-autonomy interaction in terms of the nature of a mixed human-autonomy team
partnership. The structure of this paper and associated Panel Symposium will focus on the
following aspects of HAT:
 Part 1: the nature of HAT composition and the manner in which team roles should
be considered in terms of team membership, 




     
 





       
    
       
     
    
     
      
         
    
       
       
          
          
       
     
         
 
        
        
     
       
  
     
 
     
       
    
          
      
      
  
 
       
      
        
        
    
      
 
 Part 2: the application of Cognitive Engineering as a means to design a HAT that is
based on user and system requirements,
 Part 3: an examination of the role trust plays in HAT, with the focus on using
neurophysiological measurement. 
Human-Autonomy Teaming: An evolving interaction paradigm
While there has been a fair amount of literature that examines how human teams work well
together (and when they do not), very little is known in terms of how the new human-autonomy
teaming paradigm would fare. The nature of how humans act and interact within a human-only
team construct is complex and requires a multidisciplinary approach in order to appreciate the
different roles and behaviours (Salas et al, 2010). If we consider the seminal work by Belbin (1981)
then we may begin to appreciate the importance of what a good team composition would look like, 
and also understand the nature team roles play within an effective partnership (Belbin, 1993). It 
would seem obvious that in order for a team to achieve a collective goal then individuals are likely
to be defined in such roles in order to maximise efficiency and the likelihood of achieving that
goal. Key to this effectiveness is the ability for team members to communicate with each other
(Cooke et al., 2001), and unsurprisingly it has been suggested that a HAT would require similar 
roles and dynamics that we would expect to see in a human only team (Scholtz, 2003). A goal
defined by a HAT would need to not only be a shared one (Baxter & Richards, 2010), but would 
also suggest that the nature of roles may be dynamic (depending of course on the context of the 
task/goal). This would see a team member sometimes being subservient, but in other cases
providing plans or suggest actions to be carried out - which may either be performed by a human
or an autonomous agent.
There are many different ways by which we can imagine a human interacting with an agent-
based system, and indeed the role a human team member may play within a mixed team. Richards
(2017) suggests this may present a number of alternative team constructs of HAT which begins to 
blur the boundaries of HAT composition. The construct of HAT may therefore not be as straight 
forward as we would traditionally perceive it, with the agent component not always being 
subservient to a human supervisor. In some instances we may see the agent sharing tasks in paralel 
to humans, and in some instances even providing commands to human team members. This raises
a number of important aspects of HAT worth considering; namely that of acceptance and trust. 
Richards (2017) further stresses that in order to achieve an effective HAT it is important to define
a framework of control that allows the delegation of control between the human and the agent.
This is not new, as we have seen the demand for understanding the nature of how a human can
interact with higher levels of automation and the manner in which authority may be delegated from 
human to machine (Sheridan & Verplank, 1978). Key to this interaction design is the manner by
which information is passed between team members, ensuring that the intent of the team member
conducting the task is visible. 
Further to the composition and dynamic of HAT, the manner in which the augmentation of
support is presented will dictate the effectiveness of the HAT. Within Aviation Psychology we are
only too aware of the ineffective manifestations of human-automation that relate to losing situation
awareness due to the human taking a back seat to the automation (Endlsey, 2016), the human not 
keeping up with automation in terms of understanding (Lyons, 2013) or even the human
mistrusting the automation altogether (Lyons & Stokes, 2012). The next sections will examine








           
      
         
   
     
        
     
     
      
     
 
    
  
      
      
      
     
     
    
      
  
       
     
    
         




       
 
  
    
      
   
  
     
    
 
         
   
Understanding Automation Behavior in Aviation: A practical limit to automation as a team
member
The HAT concept differs from traditional human-computer interaction, or human-systems 
integration, in that it suggests some degree of human-like qualities for the “autonomous” agent
(computer). This is in contrast to viewing the computer as, say, a processor that follows
predetermined rules, and suggests the technology can offer intelligent and adaptive solutions (Cox,
2013). With recent advances in artificial intelligence, notably machine learning, the HAT concept 
can be reasonable, and advances in human-computer interface technologies can make HAT
compelling. The issue in aviation—whether for pilots flying aircraft, or air traffic controllers
(ATC) separating traffic—is that HAT might be in conflict with one of the core human-automation
principles: the operator must sufficiently understand automated system behaviors. HAT concepts
suggest a level of complexity or intelligence that make automation behavior challenging to 
understand and predict from the human operator perspective. Furthermore, when addressing off-
nominal conditions (e.g., system degradation and failures, environmental conditions that are
beyond the design limits), the challenge of understanding behavior of an autonomous agent is
likely to be compounded.
That argument is a practical one, primarily based on lessons learned from decades of
aviation research and practice in human-automation interaction (Brown, 2016). There is not a
theoretical basis for what automation is capable of, given access to the right information, and given
that it is operating within its design envelope. But even with proper design, clear human-
automation design tradeoffs have emerged, and are well known (e.g. Hoffman & Woods, 2011; 
Woods & Branlat, 2011). For example, human supervisory control reduces excessive workload, 
but can lead to loss of situation awareness. Human-computer interfaces need to provide sufficient
information to the human and be transparent and provide mode awareness, but information 
overload and display clutter can limit this (Selkowitz et al., 2017). History has demonstrated there
are a number of inherent design tradeoffs with “traditional” human-automation interaction that 
suggest practical limits with respect to understanding by the human operator, even with substantial
training and standard operating procedures. These limits are not just important; they are drivers 
for safety-critical systems in aviation and are explored in the following two examples.
Example 1: Flight Deck
Looking back, there are many well-known examples from aircraft accidents in which a primary
factor was an off-nominal condition and a subsequent lack of understanding of that condition and
the resulting system behaviors.  The crash in 2009 of Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 is one of many
examples. In that example the crew were clearly dependent on the auto-throttle to maintain velocity
and height as they ran through their landing checklists. Unfortunately, a malfunctioning radio 
altimeter affected the auto-throttle configuration into a different flight mode (Dekker, 2009). In
such examples, even when procedures have been developed for these off-nominal conditions, 
pilots can fail to first make sense of the situation, including the resulting automation behavior, in 
order to apply the procedures appropriately. Furthermore, it is impractical to develop procedures 
for all possible combinations of off-nominal conditions, including automation—leaving the pilots
to figure out the mitigation. The point is not that there are shortcomings in pilots, pilot training,
procedures, or designs; the point is that off-nominal conditions in the context of complex systems, 
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complex procedures, and complex operations make it fundamentally challenging for pilots to 
understand the situation. Rather than designing automated systems to be more complex 
autonomous team agents, as in HAT, perhaps the focus should be on simplification.  
Example  2: Air Traffic Control
Current research by the FAA on unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) illustrate solutions centered on
simplification. UAS have great potential for intelligent automation to fly the aircraft—aviate,
navigate, communicate—within the national airspace system (NAS). But as great as their
automation potential is, we are seeing the importance of human understanding of UAS behavior
through standardization. As an example, during off-nominal “lost link” situations, in which the
pilot-in-command loses the control link, the UAS must fly autonomously for some period of time.  
During this time, what is best for the UAS can involve a complex decision that depends on its
goals, system health, altitude, weather, communications infrastructure, available airfields, etc. But
from the ATC perspective, the primary need is simple: predictability. This has been documented 
in ATC interviews, knowledge elicitation, and cognitive walkthroughs during research on
contingency operations in the Terminal and Enroute domains. Although lost link standards have
not yet been defined, it is clear that controllers primarily need to be able to understand exactly
when the UAS will maneuver (with sufficient time to issue clearances to traffic), and what exactly
the maneuver will be (from a small set of operationally suitable options). Therefore, the
sophistication of UAS automation to autonomously maneuver based on its needs might be
irrelevant because the operational constraints from the human operators (ATC), to understand what
the UAS will do, largely determines UAS behavior in that situation. In this case, human
understanding during off-nominal situations has so far been a primary driver for standardizing lost
link procedures and technologies. 
These aviation examples illustrate that there are practical limits to consider in automated
system design from the perspective of human operators, especially in off-nominal conditions. 
Pilots, air traffic controllers, and other human actors in the NAS are responsible for safety, and 
held accountable for safety.  They might benefit at times from a computer-based team member as 
viewed in the HAT metaphor, but history suggests the need something simpler, and current 
research suggests solutions moving forward could be centered on human understanding versus
more complex autonomous agents.  
Discussion
This paper represents the first part within a series of papers associated with a Panel Session
that examines the nature of HAT. Within this paper we have discussed the need for defining the
role of the team members and draw on examples in human teaming. We suggest that the same 
philosophy should be applied to teams that are composed of both human and autonomous 
members. The dynamic aspects of defining team roles and, perhaps more importantly, who has
authority within the team is worth considering. There may very well be instances where the
synthetic team member may be in a position to give commands to a human team member. In order
for a team to be effective and to respond to changing goals then the acceptance of such authority
within the team is a significant factor. It is likely however, that any composition of HAT would
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still ultimately require a human to supervise and monitor the team. Of course this is dependent on
the context of the operation. 
The autonomous team member must also be viewed as possesing a degree of intelligence
that may not be as tightly bounded to rationality as the human team members. When we consider 
applications in aviation, where HAT could afford measurable benefits, care must be taken. The
automation literature in aviation human factors provides us a with a wealth of knowledge as to the
benefits and pitfalls of applying complex systems alongside the human. When we look at the
potential use of HAT across the flight deck and within ATC there are limitations that need to be
considered. On days when the operation is routine and mundane a HAT would function in a manner
that would free up resource of the human, but in off-nominal conditions the human will be less
likely to understand (and trust) the system as to the rationale behind decisions benig presented.
This has implications to safety, acceptance and shaping the future regulatory requirement. 
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